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Russias Cyber Policy Efforts in the United Nations, Already in a Cyberwar with Russia, NATO Must Expand Article 5 to Include Cyberwarfare, Cyber Defence in NATO Countries : Comparing Models, NATOs Needed Offensive Cyber Capabilities, Cyber Conflict Uncoded : The EU and Conflict Prevention in Cyberspace, National Cyber Security Organisation : Czechia, NATO in the Cyber Age : Strengthening Security and Defence, Stabilizing Deterrence, Cybersecurity of NATOs Space-based Strategic Assets, Huawei, 5G, and China as a Security Threat, Offense as the New Defense: New Life for NATOs Cyber Policy, Preparing for Cyber Conflict : Case Studies of Cyber Command, Cybersecurity and the New Era of Space Activities, Initial Reference Architecture of an Intelligent Autonomous Agent for Cyber Defense [9 September 20169 February 2018], Achieve and Maintain Cyberspace Superiority : Command Vision for US Cyber Command, Mutually Assured Disruption : Framing Cybersecurity in Nuclear Terms. >> This would, inter alia, lead to the creation of a duplication of capabilities, resulting in an unclear distinction between offensive cyber operations inside and outside military operations. By U.S. Fleet Cyber Command/U.S. Depending on how this is done and interpreted, it can qualify as an offensive cyber operation. /Type /Catalog Frequently asked questions about USNS Comfort deployment to New York City. The sinew of maneuver across all domains is the network. As paradigmatic cases they were not chosen because of e.g. NATO will continue to adapt to the evolving cyber threat landscape. While the Dutch model strongly notes the need for collaboration between the DCC and the intelligence services, it remains ambiguous how they complement each other in practice and how organizational collaboration is supposed to fulfill goals of increased effectiveness, synergy, and flexibility. This should be done with great sensitivity to tangential elements of developing and deploying cyber capabilities such as strategic guidance, legal mandate, doctrinal procedures, human skills, technological capacity as well as the specificity of national contexts. 8 The highest-ranking civil servant in the Dutch Ministry of Defence. 58% of ransomware victims paid a ransom last year, up from 45% in 2019 and 38% in 2017. The Alliance needs to be prepared to defend its networks and operations against the growing sophistication of the cyber threats it faces. Author (s): Pernik, Piret. endobj cybersecurity suffers from institutional frag-mentation and a weak financial base. Fourth, the findings shed additional light on our understanding of how the blurring of boundaries between war and peace, military and civilian, and internal and external security, identified in security studies in the past decades, looks in the cyber domain (Christensen and Liebetrau Citation2019). Instead, its operations are based on a specific intelligence services legislation.Footnote9 The legal framework does allow MIVD to conduct counter-operations. DOD Cybersecurity Campaign. Cybersecurity scholarship has also investigated the organization of both military cyber entities (Pernik Citation2020, Smeets Citation2019) and offensive cyber capabilities (Smeets 2018). 1 0 obj The paper thereby sheds light on a pressing cybersecurity policy and governance issue that has received scarce political and academic attention. How do I access the full text of journal articles ? /ModDate (D:20161020020335-07'00') /Parent 2 0 R CDR_V2N1_2017.indd 17 3/9/17 10:41 PM. Existing scholarship has documented how European countries (Liebetrau Citation2022) and NATO (Jacobsen Citation2021) struggle to address such cyber aggressions below the threshold of war. In doing so, it speaks to four strands of cybersecurity literature touching upon military and intelligence entities.Footnote4 First, scholars have pointed out that the central (state) actors conducting cyber operations are intelligence agencies, and deceptive cyber operations, therefore, form part of an intelligence contest (Gartzke and Lindsay Citation2015; Rovner Citation2020). It is the DONs responsibility to ensure our systems are secure, our infrastructure and weapon systems are survivable, and our cyber operators can strike in and through cyberspace at a time and place of the commanders choosing. Belgium, Mon - Thu: 10:00 - 17:00 TENTH Fleet,CHIPS Magazine) /Font 51 0 R /Filter /FlateDecode Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Michael Gilday shares his navigation plan for how the U.S. Navy will continue to support U.S. maritime objectives as part of a Joint Force. As an arctic and maritime nation, U.S. economic and security interests require the Navy to work closely with U.S. interagency and foreign maritime partners to safeguard access and exploitation of Arctic resources. NATO Headquarters He also emphasized both the long-term goal of eliminating nuclear weapons and the requirement that the United States have modern, flexible, and resilient nuclear capabilities that are safe and secure until such a time as nuclear weapons can prudently be eliminated from the world. (POSTED: April 20, 2022) Submitted per Section 231 of Title 10, United States Code, this report is the Department of the Navys (DoN) 30-year shipbuilding plan for FY2023 through FY2052. Cyber Defence:Cyber threats to the security of the Alliance are complex, destructive and coercive, and are becoming ever more frequent. endstream endobj 203 0 obj <>/Metadata 21 0 R/Outlines 35 0 R/PageLayout/OneColumn/Pages 200 0 R/StructTreeRoot 112 0 R/Type/Catalog>> endobj 204 0 obj <>/ExtGState<>/Font<>/XObject<>>>/Rotate 0/StructParents 0/Tabs/S/Type/Page>> endobj 205 0 obj <>stream In the past decade, the defense cybersecurity strategies of the Netherlands have displayed the nations ambition to develop offensive cyber capabilities (Bunk and Smeets Citation2021; Claver Citation2018). How to make sure that increased collaboration and sharing of (human, technical, and economic) resources across military and intelligence entities create the desired effectiveness, synergy, and flexibility? >> Forum Cybersecurity Fellow. Given the secrecy and confidentiality that shroud the topic and the lack of existing studies, the conclusions of this piece are to be considered tentative. . The doctrine calls for increased coordination and collaboration between the Cyber Command and the intelligence services. Lawrence Michelon, a senior electronics engineer for the Systems Design and Integration Branch at Carderocks Combatant Craft Division in Norfolk, receives the Rear Adm. George W. Melville Award for engineering excellence at the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Carderock Division Honor Awards ceremony Aug. 1, 2017, in West Bethesda, Md. This collaboration is mentioned in research (Gudard Citation2020, Florant Citation2021) and journalism (Amaelle Citation2020) reviewing the development of French cyber capabilities. While our work is far from complete, the following report highlights progress made and areas demanding our greatest focus to ensure success. Arguably, the strict French division between defensive and offensive measures is being challenged by increased coordination and collaboration across defense, intelligence, and military institutions. In this new normal, the French Armed Forces must win the war before the war (Burkhard Citation2021, 13). The academic literature has paid scarce attention to how European countries organize cyber capabilities at the intersection of military cyber commands and intelligence services. They ultimately broke into fewer than 100 choice networksincluding those of Fortune 500 companies like Microsoft and the US Justice Department, State Department, and NASA (Newman Citation2021). Reports (2018) Offense as the New Defense: New Life for NATO's Cyber Policy. 15 Days to slow the spread as outlined by the White House and CDC. (POSTED: October 19, 2022) The Cyberspace Superiority Vision charts the Department of the Navys (DON) pursuit of cyberspace superiority guided by three principles: Secure, Survive, and Strike. How to make sure that priorities and decisions share the same goals? It . However, it is unclear whether decision makers have systematically assessed how the organizational model allows for the operational capacity to travel from, translate into, and shape intelligence and military entities and to which strategic and governance implications. Did you know that with a free Taylor & Francis Online account you can gain access to the following benefits? stream PB2022 provides planned funding to procure ships included in FY2022. 4 0 obj << This article advances this debate by undertaking a comparative analysis of how the Netherlands, France, and Norway organize their cyber capabilities at the intersection of intelligence services and military entities. Drawing out key organizational differences and ambiguities, the analysis identified three models of organizing military and intelligence relations: A Dutch collaboration model, a French separation model, and a Norwegian centralization model. By closing this message, you are consenting to our use of cookies. After two tragic, fatal collisions and other near misses at sea, the Readiness Reform and Oversight Council's (RROC) mandate was clear: make our Navy a safer and more combat-effective force that places the safety, readiness and training of our people first. 2 A Chinese-led hacking spree exploiting vulnerabilities in Microsofts Exchange Server to gain access to more than 30.000 victims in the US alone (Conger and Frenkel Citation2021). The arrangement will allow NATO and Finland to better protect and improve the resilience of their networks. It distinguishes itself by not having a dedicated cyber command. Organizing cyber capabilities across military and intelligence entities is only one of many related components in long-term defense planning. The Alliance needs to be prepared to defend its networks and operations against the growing sophistication of the cyber threats it faces. (Posted Oct. 27, 2021 by Naval Aviation Enterprise Public Affairs). ]}"F1;p]"D37a{ Cited by lists all citing articles based on Crossref citations.Articles with the Crossref icon will open in a new tab. % The Navy's community leader for Cryptology and Cyber Warfare released a new vision titled, "Navy Cryptologic & Cyber Warfare Community Vision" which serves as an aligning narrative for the community. First, there is a need for political and public debate about the organization of cyber capabilities across military and intelligence entities and its relation to combating cyber hostilities short of war. In a memorandum released Feb. 12, 2019, Secretary of the Navy Richard V. Spencer outlines the Department of the Navy's new focus on education. Chief of Naval Operations Adm. John Richardson released 'A Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority, Version 2.0,' Dec. 17, 2018. LAAD Defence & Security 11 - 14 Apr 2023 | Rio de Janeiro - RJ, . Malign actors seek to degrade our critical infrastructure, interfere with our government services, extract intelligence, steal intellectual property and impede our military activities (NATO Citation2022 Strategic Concept, 5). /CreationDate (D:20150518000000-07'00') Innovation, and ultimately the success of the naval mission, is based on three fundamental things: People, Information, and Ideas. /Rect [0.0 763.81604 612.0 792.0] In military operations the Intelligence Service coordinates the activity with the Armed Forces operational headquarters (FOH). It is hence clear that the competence to deploy cyber capabilities for both intelligence and military ends lies solely with the foreign intelligence service. B-1110 Brussels JSCU is a collaboration between the two Dutch intelligence and security services the MIVD and the General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD). /Producer (Mac OS X 10.10.5 Quartz PDFContext) 245 0 obj <>stream 230 0 obj <>/Filter/FlateDecode/ID[<82C9D454FA306544935F2BF957AE07B4>]/Index[202 44]/Info 201 0 R/Length 118/Prev 129030/Root 203 0 R/Size 246/Type/XRef/W[1 2 1]>>stream Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC), NATO Public Diplomacy Divisions Co-Sponsorship Grants. According to interviewees, the DCC lacks the necessary human expertise and technical infrastructure to carry out offensive cyber activities on its own. /Annots [35 0 R 36 0 R 37 0 R 38 0 R 39 0 R 40 0 R 41 0 R 42 0 R 43 0 R 44 0 R We formally analyse security gains and return on investment ratio of DHR in single-node model and defense-chain model scenarios, respectively, and show the relationships between the main parameters of DHR . hbbd``b`$ +qUAD=""gVH0* The specifics of leader development will be shaped by community leaders to be consistent with this Framework, but the fundamental concepts discussed in this Framework apply to the entire Navy Team. Cyber defence is one of the areas in which the need to step up cooperation is strongest: defence and security is what Europeans ask and expect from their leaders. Photo: Defense Dept. 8 0 obj DODIN Operations, to design, build, configure, secure, operate, maintain, and sustain DOD communications systems and networks across the entire DODIN. Reinforcing America's traditional tools of diplomacy, the Department provides military options to ensure the President and our diplomats negotiate from a position of strength. EU to beef up cybersecurity agency 13. The MIVD and JSCU are therefore crucial partners for the DCC. >> These principles encompass the DONs cyberspace activities across the entire competition continuum, from day-to-day competition to crisis and conflict. U.S. Cyber Command and the Director of National Intelligence, new Presidential Executive Order on Cybersecurity, changes to Army Doctrine, and updated cyberspace organization information. They argue that strategic outcomes in, through and from cyberspace are possible short of war (Michael and Harknett Citation2020, 1). endstream endobj 99 0 obj <. 'Cqi8fd`0"wR!|6_0zH30~33^0 {; There is hence a need for increased attention and a focused approach to how the country-specific organizational model allows for operational capacity to travel from, translate into, and shape intelligence and military entities and to which implications. NATO will continue to adapt to the evolving cyber threat landscape. International Centre for Defence and Security (ICDS), December 2018. endobj This scholarship is, however, guided by crafting conceptual frameworks (Smeets 2018, Citation2019) or mapping the development of cyber commands (Pernik Citation2020). Norway has kept with this model in order to foster synergies and reduce the costs of developing and deploying cyber capabilities. /CropBox [0.0 0.0 612.0 792.0] These are both passive and active defense operations and are conducted inside and outside of DODIN. . The 2017 Navy Program Guide describes the platforms, payloads, systems and technologies already fielded, and those being developed. Private Sector Cyber Defense : Can Active Measures Help Stabilize Cyberspace ? It further details how each of the Office of Naval Research's (ONR) six Integrated Research Portfolios (IRPs) address the priorities for their respective naval domain customers. Consequently, also in the French case, it is ambiguous how the entities complement each other in practice, and how the desired organizational collaboration will achieve impact. This Arctic Strategic Outlook describes the United States Navy's strategic approach to protect U.S. national interests and promote stability in the Arctic. Fri: 10:00 - 15:30, NATO Secretary General's Annual Report 2020, NATO Secretary General's Annual Report 2019. Remarks by the Hon. QDR seeks to adapt, reshape, and rebalance our military to prepare for the strategic challenges and opportunities we face in the years ahead. These are protection, military action, intelligence, and judicial investigation (Secrtariat gnral de la dfense et de la scurit nationale Citation2018, 56). Today (16 February 2017), NATO and Finland stepped up their engagement with the signing of a Political Framework Arrangement on cyber defence cooperation. The National Fleet Plan identifies U.S. Navy and U.S. Coast Guard authorities, methods, and measurements to avoid redundancies and achieve economies of scale. A related, yetalternative, argument is brought forward by supporters of cyber persistence theory. 3523 - Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act, President Ilves at Harvard University: all members of NATO must share a common understanding of cyber security, Congressional Testimony: U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Securing Americas Future: The Cybersecurity Act of 2012., International Cyber Diplomacy: Promoting Openness, Security and Prosperity in a Networked World, International Strategy for Cyberspace : Prosperity, Security, and Openness in a Networked World, Protecting Cyberspace as a National Asset Act of 2010, Cyberspace Policy Review : Assuring a Trusted and Resilient Information and Communications Infrastructure, The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace. TheNavy Aviation Vision 2030-2035reflects key concepts to meet CNOs vision of a Navy that swarms the sea, delivering synchronized lethal and non-lethal efforts from near and far, on every axis and in every domain. B-1110 Brussels Why does Norway not have a standalone cyber command? Consequently, the paper neither provides an exhaustive conceptualization of the organization of cyber capabilities, nor a set of fully fledged policy prescriptions of the requirements for intelligence services or military cyber commands to conduct specific cyber operations. 11 The French defence procurement and technology agency (DGA) is responsible for project management, development, and purchase of weapon systems for the French military. The Unmanned Campaign Plan represents the Navy and Marine Corps strategy for making unmanned systems a trusted and integral part of warfighting. The German Marshall Fund of the United States, 13 December 2018. It is, however, crucial to examine and assess the organization of cyber capabilities if we are to better understand the practical, political, and democratic implications of engaging with the current challenges that persistent cyber operations short of war as well as military cyber operations in armed conflict amount to. /Type /Page >> The ANSSI is organizationally separated from the intelligence and military branch of French cybersecurity. >> endobj The organization of Norwegian cyber capabilities rests on a centralized model. Note: According to Section 1.4 Transition Plan of the new instruction, the old DoDI 5000.02 dated Jan 7, 2015 (Change 3 dated 10 Aug 2017) has been renumbered to DoDI 5000.02T. This not only makes it difficult to select and impact targets, but it also makes it hard to attract and maintain the necessary human skills (Smeets Citation2021). Taillat (Citation2019) finds the ambiguity to be partly deliberate, but stresses how it brings to light the resulting loopholes when attempting to draw organizational boundaries in a new context of operations. This calls for cooperation and coordination across military and intelligence entities. The observed divergence in organizing cyber capabilities raises several questions for policy makers, practitioners, and scholars to consider. According to Microsoft President Brad Smith, the largest and most sophisticated attack the world has ever seen (Villarreal Citation2021). stream xSN@oKK/jAT#2!!VBDw4BUwx9:aM_r$F/U?|x+U_-iz The plan stresses that the ability of the e-service [foreign intelligence service] in peace, crisis and in armed conflict to follow, attribute, warn and actively counter digital threats also before events occur, shall be further developed. This paper relies primarily on written public sources, such as official government statements and publications, media reports, and academic literature. /Filter /FlateDecode xmAN0Es 9viAHH&b:.$gcoO2wv$-q(3%S.PB4JX-qX3svv==Pr@YCRLKJ"ib5s@'DB&r]~OSu\Yyd9SB,-Oxot.s l[3`gvnal?8f,^OiV"2v(q$ Bb Drawing out key organizational differences and ambiguities, the analysis identifies three models of organizing military and intelligence relations: A Dutch collaboration model, a French separation model, and a Norwegian centralization model. Responding to global challenges under the leadership of the CNO and guided by the precepts of our "Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority" the U.S. The analysis of the Dutch organization of cyber capabilities shows organizational separation between the DCC which can deploy cyber capabilities in the event of armed conflict and war and the intelligence services that can deploy cyber capabilities for intelligence and active defense purposes. >> >> %%EOF 9 These operations are based on 2017 Intelligence and Security Services Act and are not conducted as military operations. Policy Brief ; 39. However, the Ministry does not elaborate on how the coordination between the intelligence service and the operational headquarters plays out or what it exactly entails. 138 0 obj <>stream This development finds support in the Strategic Vision of the Chief of Defense Staff from October 2021. This has arguably led to overly militarized approaches to cyber security (Burton and Christou Citation2021, 1732). In recent years, the DGSE has become more open about its work, but it remains a very secretive service (Chopin Citation2017: 546). It describes both intelligence and military cyber operations as offensive actions, notes that they are usually carried out in the network of the opponent, and stresses that their execution falls under the responsibility of the chief of the intelligence service (Forsvarsdepartementet Citation2014, 6 and 17). This strategy establishes objectives to meet this aim and support national policy. In parallel, the EU Directive on the security of network and information systems (NIS Directive) forces member states to adopt legal measures to boost the overall level of their cybersecurity by May 2018. The Education for Seapower (E4S) study was a clean-sheet review of naval learning and focused on flagship institutions like the U.S. (POSTED: May 24, 2022) The U.S. Navy and Marine Corps climate strategy, Climate Action 2030, setsthe Department of the Navy (DON) on a path to achieve the Nations commitment to net-zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2050, while becoming a more capable, agile, and lethal fighting force. This calls for cooperation and coordination across military and intelligence entities. Third, it is paramount to strengthen the awareness of how organizational divergences might hamper collaboration at the level of intelligence sharing, EU cybersecurity governance, and NATO cyber operations. However, under the Joint Cyber Coordination Center (FCKS), the intelligence service collaborates and coordinates with the National Security Authority (NSM), the Policy Security Service (PST), and The National Criminal Investigation Service (Kripos) when it comes to countering and dealing with severe cyber operations (Forsvarsdepartementet Citation2020, 7677). At the time of writing, there is no public information that the DCC has conducted offensive cyber operations. 4 I recognize the scholarly literature on international law and the use of cyber force, but it falls outside the scope of this article to deal with it in length (see e.g. The Commission recommends cementing the role of the European Union Agency for Network and Information Security as the key cyber security agency, and providing it with more resources to develop policy, implement capacity-building programmes, support research, and establish a cyber security certification scheme. << 10 Except for the French Ministry of Defense. The French Military Cyber Strategy that so far consists of three separate documents: the Ministerial Policy for Defensive Cyber Warfare, the Public Elements for the Military Cyber Warfare Doctrine, and the Public Elements for Cyber Influence Warfare Doctrine (Ministre des Armeses Citation2019a, Citation2019b, Citation2021) does, however, not elaborate on the collaboration between the COMCYEBR and the intelligence services. In 2017 it became the cyber defense command (COMCYBER) and was placed directly under the chief of staff of the armed force. The NRE Addendum to the Naval Research and Development Framework includes additional detail about how the priorities in the Framework correlate to research subtopics. This arrangement is a good example of the cooperation between NATO and Finland it is practical, substantial and at the same time mutually beneficial. The DCC does not have mandate to play an active role in disrupting continuous adversarial cyber behavior short of war. << 98 0 obj <> endobj Author (s): Arts, Sophie. The JSCU forms the cornerstone of the Dutch defense against advanced state-sponsored cyberattacks (advanced persistent threats) targeting ministries, infrastructure providers, and companies. The plan highlights the Navys work in coordination with the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) to build a modernized naval force that makes needed contributions to advance the Joint Forces ability to campaign effectively, deter aggression, and, if required, win decisively in combat. Naval Academy, Naval Postgraduate School, and Naval and Marine War Colleges, along with a fresh look at the relationships with civilian academic institutions and corporate learning structures. However, the documents do neither elaborate on the organizational collaboration between the Cyber Command and the intelligence services nor how cyber operations are meant to complement to each other at the strategic, tactical, or operational levels. First, cyber operations are often custom-made combinations of intelligence, intrusion, and attack (Smeets Citation2018). We look forward to enhancing our situational awareness and exchanging best practices with Finland, including through dedicated points of contact for rapid information exchange on early warning information and lessons learned, said Ambassador Sorin Ducaru, NATO Assistant Secretary General for Emerging Security Challenges. /Count 3 According to Stphane Taillat (Citation2019), a significant part of offensive cyber operations is the responsibility of the DGSE and lies outside of the French military cyber strategy. A key pillar in the organization of French cyber capabilities is a governance model that separates offensive missions and capabilities from defensive missions and capabilities (Desforges Citation2022; Liebetrau Citation2022). /Type /Pages It provided the Russian intelligence service with the ability to infect SolarWind users. << << The Maritime Security Cooperation Policy renews our focus on preventing war, operating forward in new and flexible ways, and being postured to prevail should conflict arise. It is seldom distinct where one stage ends, and another begins. The selection of the three countries rests on a combination of pragmatic reasoning in terms minimizing the language barrier and achieving access to interviewees, and the fact that the countries represent a large-, a medium-, and a small-sized European country with ambitious cybersecurity policies and long-term publicly declared ambitions of developing offensive cyber capabilities. /Keywords (Cybersecurity, Spectrum, Telecommunications, Wireless) The Navy must find innovative ways to defend and protect its assets against cyber attacks, a top service official said. The EU's Cybersecurity Strategy for the Digital Decade. Organizing cyber capability between military and intelligence, The Netherlands: organizational collaboration, Conclusion: future paths for policy and research, https://english.defensie.nl/topics/cyber-security/cyber-command, https://www.ihemi.fr/articles/organisation-france-europe-cybersecurite-cyberdefense-V2. Drawing out these three models of organizing cyber capabilities and their dominant characteristics, should be considered a starting point for further explorations and discussions of how European countries can and ought to organize their cyber capabilities across intelligence and military entities. wv statewide warrant search, black button bourbon cream nutrition facts, how many countries has china taken over,